The projected collapse of edible fish in the oceans. The percentage of the edible fish population over the period 1950-2050 is shown in red. Over the same period, the increase in human population (in billions) is shown in black. The fish-related data is based on the 2006 Science article “Impacts of biodiversity loss on ocean ecosystem services”. by Boris Worm, et al.
Questions about the survival of humans. Some intellectuals, including Professor James Lovelock, who advanced the Gaia hypothesis, and Frank Fenner, the microbiology professor who helped wipe out smallpox, believe that humanity will become extinct this century. The actualization of such an apocalyptic view may be possible, but it is not necessary; for this reason it ought to be rejected, because it discourages actions that could prevent it.
Converging trends. There are several independent converging trends that threaten humanity. These include:
* The projected extinction of edible fish in the oceans. The population of edible fish in the oceans is projected to go extinct by 2050.
* The increasing toxicity of drinking water. Sewage and industrial pollution are making drinking water increasingly toxic. Water now contains some 60,000 different chemicals, some of which are known to be carcinogenic or otherwise toxic. But the health effect of most of these chemicals has never been studied. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to regulate less than one hundred pollutants, but it has failed to exercise that authority. For all intents and purposes, the existence and activities of the EPA are irrelevant, and unable to address the scope and severity of the problem.
* The collapse of domesticated bee colonies. Domesticated bees pollinate crops. In the last fifty years, a major collapse of bee colonies has reduced the number of bees per hectare by nearly 90%.
* The rise in sea level. Sea level is projected to rise by a meter, or about three feet, by the end of this century. The resulting flooding will force tens of millions to migrate to higher grounds. This is obviously of outmost consequence for those regions that are expected to be flooded, but of less consequence for other regions. But any action to delay such a rise in sea level cannot be merely regional – it must be global.
What ought to be done to avert the impending crisis?
1. The action must be global in scope
2. Such global action requires commitment of significant resources
3. Compliance must be compulsory rather than voluntary
4. Action must commence this decade
The tabula rasa doctrine denies the existence of common grounds for ethics and law. Present-day philosophy is still based on the 300 year-old assumption that all knowledge is based on experience, and that none is innate. But only what is innate may be universal. For this reason, present-day philosophy precludes the possible existence of universal ethics and law. Ordinary, so-called positive law is relativistic, while religious based ethics is based on dogma. In the absence of explicitly formulated common grounds, current international issues are based on power relations and the diverse interests of political parties.
Human conduct is derivable from innate and universals of human nature. Neuroscientists now know that humans do have innate faculties, including universal needs and desires, such as hunger, thirst, pain, and pleasure. Hence, human conduct is derivable from human nature. This is a fundamental fact. Its application will transform ethics and law.
The challenge confronting the philosophic community. The philosophic community is uniquely situated to make explicit how ethics and law need to be transformed by the recognition that human conduct can, and ought to be, derived from innate and universal aspects of human nature. Setting aside a 300-year-old epistemology is likely to involve a generational change, and thus will not occur in time to make a difference. Additional time will be needed for the political leadership to accept the new state of affairs.
Conclusion. While it is still possible to avert the various crises that face us, and to do so this decade, it is unlikely. In the absence of such collective action, those countries that do recognize these crises will fare better than those that do not.
0.1
Darwin and the philosophic community. In The Descent of Man (1871), Darwin applied his theory of evolution to humans, concluding that we possess some forms of behavior that are innate. In the Expression of Emotion in Animals and Man (1872), he extended those conclusions to mental faculties. Earlier, John Locke, in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1705), proposed the contrary view that the brain of the newborn is like a blank slate (tabula rasa), and that postnatal experience is limited to input from the senses. The English speaking philosophic community has, by and large, accepted Darwin’s theory of evolution, but has thus far rejected Darwin’s application of evolution to the innateness of mental faculties. Present-day science has proved Darwin right.
0.2
Sensations are evoked in the brain. The use of auditory prostheses by those who are born deaf is the most common example demonstrating that sensations are evoked in the brain, and not imported into it. The electrical stimulation of the auditory nerve or auditory brain of children born deaf elicits sensations of sound (Kuchta J. 2004; Colletti V. et al. 2005). Hence, sensations of sound are evoked in the brain and are not received from the ears, and are not properties of air vibration. The same is true of all sensations (Sperry R. 1952; von Buddenbrock W. 1953/1958; Gardner E.P., Martin J. H. 2000; Brugger P. et al. 2000).
0.3
The scope the tabula rasa assumption. Locke’s tabula rasa doctrine underlies the following:
- Ethics and law
- Physicalism
- The computer metaphor of the brain
- Empiricism
0.4
Replacing the tabula rasa assumption. The replacement of the tabula rasa assumption by the fact that sensations and some other mental faculties are innate would constitute, by definition, the new foundation of knowledge. Nominally, the implications of such a change would be co-extensive with the implications of the tabula rasa assumption. Making explicit the implications of this paradigm change will inevitably become the central challenge confronting the philosophic community in the coming decades.
0.5
What ought to be done. The current technological revolution has given society a false sense of control over its future. But the opposite is true. The fact that present-day theories of knowledge, ethics, and law are based on a 300-year old misconception has deprived society the ability to effectively address these problems or even comprehend what these problems are. It is as if technology is catapulting humanity into an unknown future with a dysfunctional guidance system. The issue is survival, not philosophy. First, we must set aside the tabula rasa assumption, and then we must undertake the decades-long challenge of making explicit the implications of the new state of affairs.
1.
Interoception, needs and desires
1.1
Interoception. In humans, the sensations of hunger and thirst are innate and universal. They exemplify interoreception-based sensations, which are related to the maintenance of homeostatic internal body states (Cannon 1932/1963). The existence of universals of human nature underlies universals of human conduct. It provides the grounds for non-relativistic ethics and law.
1.2
Interoception and the tabula rasa doctrine. The tabula rasa doctrine implies that no needs and desires are innate. Only what is innate can be universal in human nature. Hence, the tabula rasa doctrine severs human conduct, ethics and law from human nature. It thus deprives ethics and law of any basis other than convention or dogma. The Vienna Circle recognized this implication of the tabula rasa doctrine when they removed ethics from the empirical domain. It so came to pass that other than convention or dogma, present-day ethics and law have no foundation.
1.3
Interoception and teleology. Interoception is involved in the homeostatic regulation of internal body states. Homeostasis is a teleological concept. Following Galileo, teleology was purged from scientific explanations until the last quarter of the 20th century. The mathematics of servomechanism restored the acceptability of teleological explanation ((Rosenbleuth, Wiener and Bieglow 1943). The cell, while it is alive, maintains some variables within narrow set-points that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium. The cellular mechanisms that make this balancing act possible are inherently homeostatic and are thus teleological in their function. Hence, teleology is a defining characteristic of life. Temperature homeostasis in mammals provides needed uniformity of chemical processes. This relative independence of variations of outside temperature is especially important for brain function.
1.4
Interoception, homeostasis and the mental. Mental states are evoked whenever voluntary action is needed to restore homeostasis (Figure 3). Such restoration is associated with positive affect. But shortly after restoration of homeostasis, the involvement of the mental is withdrawn, and operation returns to non-conscious regulation. Thus, in interoception, mental states appear when automatic mechanisms are insufficient to restore homeostasis, and disappear, soon after homeostasis is restored. Apparently, the mind plays a role in interoception.
1.5
An implication. The current application of the tabula rasa doctrine to needs and desires make it impossible to reach evidence-based consensus among people of different religions and ethnicities. Hence, the central moral imperative of our time is to set aside that doctrine, and then seek to derive human conduct from human nature. Such action would also provide an empirical foundation for the legal theory of natural law.
2.
Physicalism in the 20th century
2.0
Locke’s tabula rasa is dualistic. John Locke partitioned that which is perceived into primary and secondary qualities. He called primary qualities those qualities that are like size and shape, which he believed are attributes of the external world; he called secondary qualities attributes those that he believed to originate in the senses and not belong to external world, such as color and sound. This partition made Locke’s version of the tabula rasa assumption dualistic.
2.1
Rudolf Carnap. In the 1920’s, a group known as the Vienna circle, initially named after Ernst Mach, sought to purge the tabula rasa doctrine from Locke’s dualistic formulation. In his book The Analysis of Sensations (1904/1914), Mach stated that the first-person perspective underlies observations that are deemed public. Rudolf Carnap, who was a leader of the Vienna circle, reached similar conclusions in his book The Logical Construction of the World (1928/2003). Carnap therefore recommended that the first-person perspective be adopted as the basis for a non-dualistic reformulation of the tabula rasa assumption.
2.2
Otto Neurath. The first-person perspective is deemed subjective and, as such, as inconsistent with Materialism. Thus, Otto Neurath Neurath, an ardent (Marxist) Materialist, objected to the selection of the first-person perspective as the basis for a non-dualistic language of science. He insisted that the third-person perspective be selected instead. Carnap relented, and so it was. Carnap explained the reversal of his position by saying that the decision was not a necessary one, but a matter of choice. But soon thereafter, the notion that there is a choice in the matter was discarded. It is inexplicable why Carnap did not address this sharp departure from his stated position. Neurath then renamed Materialism as Physicalism.
2.3
Gilbert Ryle. In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle presented the reader with the choice between Physicalistic behaviorism and dualism. He then effectively argued against dualism and rested his case. The book implies that the rejection of dualism leaves Physicalism as the remaining alternative. This formulation relieved Ryle from the need of arguing against the first-person perspective, and even of the need to defend Physicalism. The book was a smashing success. It made Physicalism the quasi-official position of the English-speaking philosophic community.
2.4
Innateness of sensations and Physicalism. Empirical evidence demonstrates that sensations are innate and are evoked in the brain (Von Buddenbrock 1932/1963, Sperry 1952, Gardner & Martin 2000). As a consequence, sensory qualities are not publicly observable. It is therefore necessarily the case that observations that are deemed public are ultimately based on the first-person perspective: Physicalism is no longer tenable. It cannot be reconciled with the fact that the knowledge of the physical is derived from observation and inference, neither of which satisfies the criterion of physicality.
3.
Neuroanatomic determinants of neural function
3.0
Two conflicting views of neural function. The discovery of the structure of DNA in 1953 showed the cell to be complex and autonomous. Prior to that discovery, the neuron was viewed as a tabula rasa cell, whose output is computable from its inputs alone. In fact, neurons emit input-independent output. For example, hypothalamic neurons that generate circadian rhythm do so also in the absence of any input and do so in vitro as well. The view of the simpleton cell led some to believe that the brain is a computer (McCulloch and Pitts 1943/1990, Smolensky 1994). In biology, function is structure-dependent, while in computers, it is not. Thus, if the brain is a computer, then there can be no unique neuro-anatomic correlates to any neural function or to a correlated mental state. This issue must be resolved in order that the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) be identified. It is addressed below.
3.1
Structure-independent function. The general-purpose digital computer is an implementation of Alan Turing’s abstract, simple, and explicit formulation of computation, known as the Universal Turing Machine, or UTM (Turing 1936). The program, or algorithm, that represents a possible function of a UTM, can be processed on computers with different hardware designs. Thus, an algorithm does not, and cannot possibly have, a single unique hardware implementation.
3.2
Structure-dependent function.
3.2.1
Molecules, cells, and cell type distribution. Skin, muscle and bone cells of an organism differ in their constitutively-expressed proteins. This protein specificity accounts for both the cell’s phenotype and its intrinsic function (Figure 4). What is true of all cell types is true of brain cells. Their protein specificity determines both their phenotype and intrinsic function. Structural biology infers intrinsic function of a molecule from its structure. Molecular biology of the cell extends structure-dependence to the molecules constituting the cell. Cytoarchitecture maps the three-dimensional distribution of cell types. Korbinian Brodmann mapped the cytoarchitecture of the human cerebral cortex (1905/2006) into functional areas. For example, Brodmann area 4 is the primary motor cortex, area 17 is the primary visual cortex, and area 41 is the primary auditory cortex. This identification of intrinsic function is exclusively structure-dependent: it makes reference to neither interactivity nor connectivity.
3.2.2
Intrinsic neural function determines mental states. Structure determines intrinsic function and intrinsic function determines mental states. Hence, structure determines mental states.
3.3
The brain is not a UTM. This section constitutes the first empirical proof that the brain is not a Universal Turing Machine.
4.
Empiricism and innate cognition
4.0
Do we have innate knowledge about the world prior to experience? Empiricism is an epistemological position that denies that the newborn can have any knowledge about the world prior to postnatal experience. This position was developed by David Hume (1777/1975), who applied Locke’s tabula rasa assumption to cognition. Hume maintained that all knowledge is obtained only through the senses and denied that we may have any innate and universal cognitive knowledge about the world. Emanuel Kant (1787/1999) rejected that position, maintaining instead that we have innate and universal cognitive mechanisms, which impose structure on input from the senses. For example, Kant maintained that our perception of space as three-dimensional is innate and universal, and that it underlies Newtonian physics.
4.1
The perception of space as three-dimensional is innate. The retina provides two-dimensional visual information about perceived space. Yet, we perceive it as three-dimensional, even when looking with only one eye. This implies that the perception of depth does not originate in the eyes. It is not based on experience either: If a baby is placed on an opaque part of an otherwise transparent tabletop, it will look at the transparent part and will avoid crawling there (Gibson & Walk 1960). Taken together, these two observations – that depth perception does not originate in the eye, and that even a newborn baby perceives depth – show that there is an innate cognitive mechanism that imposes a three-dimensional interpretation on the input from the eyes.
4.2
Euclidean geometry and Newtonian physics. The so-called inverse square laws in physics follow from solid geometry of three-dimensions where lines of force are rectilinear (Figure 1). Hence, the inverse square laws are implicit in the knowledge about the world of the newborn, even prior to any postnatal experience. In this regard, Kant proved right.
4.3
Knowledge prior to experience. Present-day theories of physics are not yet in a final form, but they nevertheless constitute knowledge about the world. Newtonian physics is a familiar example: it is a non-final theory, but it constitutes knowledge about the world. There are aspects of Newtonian physics can be derived by taking space to be three-dimensional, and these constitute obtainable knowledge about the world prior to input from the senses – this is in direct opposition to the assumption that defines Empiricism, which may be defined as the denial that humans have, or can have, any knowledge about the world prior to input from the senses. So defined, Empiricism has proved to be factually false.
4.4
The inductive inference. Fundamental scientific advances involve the generalizing inductive inference. The inductive inference is not deductively valid. Like geometrical and mathematical concepts, the inductive inference is rooted in innate and universal cognitive mechanisms. Empirical investigation of these mechanisms is likely to shed light on the logic implicit in scientific induction.
References
Alberts B. et al. Molecular Biology of the Cell. 5rd ed. 2008. Garland Publishing, Inc.
Brodmann K. Localization in the Cerebral Cortex: the Principles of Comparative Localization in the Cerebral Cortex based on Cytoarchitecture. Translated by L. J. Garey. 1905/-2006. New York, NY. Springer-Verlag.
Brugger P. et al. Beyond Re-membering: Phantom Sensations of Congenitally Absent Limbs. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 2000 May 23;97(11):6167-72.
Cannon W. B. The Wisdom of the Body. 1932/1963. New York: N. N. Norton and Company, Inc.
Carnap R. The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy. Translated by RA George. 1928/2003. Peru, Illinois. Open Court.
Colletti V. et al. Auditory Brainstem Implant (ABI): New Frontiers in Adults and Children. Otolaryngol Head Neck Surg. 2005 Jul;133(1): 126-38.
Darwin C. The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. 1871. London, UK. John Murray.
Darwin C. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals. 1872. London, UK. John Murray
Gardner E. P., Martin J. H. Coding of Sensory Information. Principles of Neural Science. Edited by Kandel E.R. et al. 4th Edition. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Gibson, E. J. Walk R.D. The “Visual Cliff”. Scientific American. April 1960.
Hume D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 2nd edition. Edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. 1777/1975. The Clarendon Press.
Kant, E. Critique of Pure Reason. 2nd edition. 1787/1999. Translated by Guyer P. and Wood A. Cambridge University Press.
Kuchta J. Neuroprosthetic Hearing with Auditory Brainstem Implants. Biomed Tech (Berl). 2004 Apr;49(4):83-7.
Locke, J. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1705/1975. Edited by P.H. Niddith. The Clarendon Press.
Mach, E. The Analysis of Sensations. 1906/1914. Translated by Willimans C. M. and Waterlow S. Chicago.
McCulloch W. S. and Pitts W. H. A Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity. Reprinted in McCulloch W. S. Embodiments of Mind. 1943/1990. The MIT Press.
Rosenblueth R, Wiener N, Bigelow J. Behavior, Purpose and Teleology. Philosophy of Science. January 1943. Volume 10: 18-24.
Ryle G. The Concept of Mind. 1949. London, UK. Hutchinson & Company, Ltd.
Smolensky P. Computational Models of Minds. A companion to the philosophy of mind. Edited by S.Guttenplan. 1994. Blackwell Publishers, Ltd.
Sperry R. Neurology and the Mind-Body Problem. American scientist. 1952. 40: 291-312
Turing, A. On Computable Numbers with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem. Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society. 1936. 42: 230-65. 43: 644-6.
Von Buddenbrock W. The Senses. 1953/1958. Translated by F. Gaynor. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Watson J. D., Crick F. H. Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids; a Structure for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid. Nature. 1953.
